SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

In February 1999, AHRC submitted to us a compilation of evidence detailing the charge that militarization has caused food scarcity. Along with a series of written depositions, it contained history, statistics and excerpts from numerous reports about Burma’s government and economy. Also provided were several explanatory maps and a collection of photographs detailing aspects of the evidence. After reviewing the compilation, the People’s Tribunal convened in Thailand to hear testimony firsthand. On April 2-4 twenty-six witnesses made depositions. We interviewed nine of these people in Bangkok, and the remaining seventeen in Tak Province. Most of the depositions were recorded on audio cassette and later transcribed. Witnesses who gave testimony in languages other than English worked through interpreters, and their depositions were later translated into English for documentary purposes. It is not practical to insert all the evidence in this report. Instead, we include a clear and representative sample. 1

Untold Sorrows: Food and War

The evidence demonstrates that food scarcity is a national trend which varies according to regional political and economic conditions. Most notable are differences between areas with armed conflict and areas without it. Terminology differentiating these areas is problematic. The government does not use the term "civil war," preferring instead to consider the conflict an insurgency by "illegal armed groups." On the other side, opposition groups see the armed conflict as revolution or even war for independence. It is outside the Tribunal’s scope of inquiry to investigate and decide on the conflict’s political classification; we are concerned with the relationship between armed conflict and hunger. In keeping with the general trend of the testimony brought before it, the Tribunal uses the terms "civil war zones" and "non-civil war zones," without bias or obligation to any political significance they might connote.

Nevertheless, terminology problems remain. Civil war zones are often further divided into "black" and "brown" zones, the former meaning areas considered by the government to be outside its effective control, and the latter denoting areas over which its control is incomplete. It is widely reported that this further division, along with the term "white zone" for areas without an insurgent challenge, is a fundamental military tactic employed by the government. Both types of zone experience consistent human rights abuse. Furthermore, the term "free-fire zone" declares an area to be under a form of military control which allows soldiers to shoot anyone on sight without the need to determine identity. Again, the government doesn’t use these terms in its public documents or mass media. Regardless of whether these divisions originate from the government, the Tribunal finds them logical and useful descriptors for real conditions, and elects to use them here.

People are forced into the jungle, hiding their rice and struggling to survive without medicine, schools or much contact with the outside world

 

Food Under Fire

Remote regions of Burma are exposed to primitive but militarily effective scorched-earth tactics. According to Tatmadaw strategy these are "free-fire" areas, in which all people are suspected of insurgency and are treated as the enemy. People are subjected to indiscriminate executions and a panoply of other human rights abuses, mass destruction of crops and villages and massive population displacement. The Burmese army has devised what is known as the "Four Cuts" strategy to deny rebels (1) food (2) money (3) communication and (4) recruits. In practice, the strategy does not differentiate between combatants and civilians. To begin with, selected areas 40 to 50 miles square are cordoned off for concentrated military operations. The army then orders villages to move to strategic locations under its control. Soldiers may warn that anyone who refuses to move will be treated as an insurgent and can be shot on sight. After the first visit, troops return periodically to confiscate food, destroy crops and paddy and shoot anyone suspected of supporting insurgents.

The evidence collected by Saw Kwe Say in respect to Papun and Kyauk Kyi Townships describes how people are dealt with in insurgent zones. While the army has its bases in the lowlands, people are forced to live in the jungle "hiding their rice and struggling to survive without medicine, schools or much contact with the outside world." People say that they are always on the run for they do not know when the soldiers will come. They face immense hardship:

Map 5: Pegu Division (Click to view full image)

"This year we ran from the army four times. The third time, they pulled all the paddy stalks from the ground and burned down the field hut"

When the army columns come into the mountains, they destroy any houses they find, shoot whoever they see, and take or burn all food and possessions. If they come to a village, they don’t see any people because everyone has run into the forest already. If they find rice stored in the jungle, they take or burn it, or sometimes lay land mines around it. We always look for a safe place deep in the jungle to hide our food…These hiding places may be safe from soldiers, but not from wildlife. 2

Because of these harsh military pressures in an already difficult natural environment, the villagers constantly struggle to feed themselves:

One woman in my mother’s village was growing rice to feed her four children. The soldiers came so she abandoned her small field for a while. As a result the crop wasn’t very good. Before harvest, a pack of wild boar came and destroyed about one fourth of her crop. After harvest, we left the cut rice stalks to dry in the fields, and the boars came back for another quarter. Finally, when we were preparing fields for the next crop they came back again. When she saw what had happened she just sat down, stared at what was left of her rice and began to cry.

Picture 11: "The rice they couldn’t carry away, they set on fire

 

Saw Kwe Say appeared before us and submitted further information he collected relating to a village called T’kwiso, where villagers said:

This year we ran from the army four times, and three times in September they really reached our location. The first time they took all our possessions. The second time they destroyed all our crops. The third time, they pulled all the paddy stalks from the ground and burned down the field hut.

He stated that this year families would face extreme hardship from the soldiers coming and destroying the grain and foodstuffs, and also from having to flee.

Displaced people have little forewarning and little time to prepare food for their stay in the jungle. Even their food can become a liability, as reported during a 1997 military operation in Kyauk Kyi Township:

The villagers of Nwar Lay Khoh knew that troops were approaching, so they began to evacuate their houses. They fled into the scrub, dangerously close. They had to kill roosters and geese, because their cries travel far and might reveal the hideout. For security, dogs too were beaten to death—there is a lot in the jungle to bark at. 3

According to another researcher, Dee Gay Htoo, as the army passes through villages it indiscriminately destroys food. He states that:

The biggest problem is getting food. Troops have destroyed virtually everything of last year’s crop and now people are trying to plant, but there hasn’t been any rain, so the crops are poor. The suffering is extreme. Most people are living only off bamboo shoots and other roots.

Dee Gay Htoo filed another report in October 1998 which details military attacks on other villages in Papun. For example, in Tei Bo Plaw Village:

Battalion 706 burned down two sections of Tei Bo Plaw. Khler Hat Htah was destroyed on 31 October 1997, and Maw Pho Khi on 12 November. Twenty-two houses were burned. The army stayed in Tei Bo Plaw for about one week. The villagers fled into the forest but couldn’t take much food. Altogether, 71 barns were burned, and the people lost 3,692 baskets of grain. 4

Map 3: Karen State (Click to view full image)

In another village, Doh Daw Khi, Dee Gay Htoo continues,

When the villagers fled, they couldn’t take very much food with them. They fed what they had to the children, and the adults fasted. They went and secretly grabbed food now and then. One woman gave birth during this time, but the child died, due to the conditions in the forest. These villagers have had to hide out there for five months, the entire rainy season. Most are animists whose religion stipulates that any place destroyed by fire cannot be rebuilt for three years.

In this way, we have details of several villages destroyed by the army in Papun region. There is also a report by Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) which lists 105 villages forced to relocate, 180 burned down and 10 more partially destroyed. 5

Picture 12: "The people live in fear that the army will search and find them."

From Kyauk Kyi Township we heard similar allegations of army abuse. Saw Kwe Klo reported that the army

..looted and destroyed property in every village they entered. They arrived in Nwar Lay Khoh on March 14, and burned down 32 houses. They ate all the ducks, chickens and pigs they saw. The people work swidden farms. The land must be prepared in February, but because of the army people didn’t come back until May. This has meant a very poor crop... 6

Picture 13: "I saw one family close to utter starvation, the two small children crying from hunger."

"The biggest problem is getting food. Troops have destroyed virtually everything of last year’s crop... The suffering is extreme."

There are many instances of similarly tragic experiences narrated by villagers. Hunger can force unarmed civilians into deadly encounters with the army. On 3 April 1997, soldiers entered Thay Khoh Mu Der, whose inhabitants evacuated immediately

without preparing any food for themselves. They had nothing to eat in the forest. The army burned 36 houses and 14 barns containing 200-400 baskets each. Some villagers decided to come back for hidden rice. Five men fearfully returned, but the soldiers saw them and started to shoot. Phar Khin Sein, aged 50, was killed and the others escaped. 7

Saw Htoo K’baw, a teacher from Papun Township gave his statement to Saw Khwar Hsit, a Tribunal researcher.8 They both appeared before us on April 4. Like most of the people from his village, Saw Htoo K’baw came to Thailand two years ago. In his first statement he recalled, "Starting from January 1992, the Burma army soldiers began to battle KNU there and destroyed villages. They patrolled and skirmished, and so 1992 was the first year that there were food problems." However, he stayed on even when others had left. He gave a year by year account, starting with his own efforts to earn a living during the school break:

In January I planned to trade in biscuits, Ajinomoto and clothing to get extra money. The soldiers were patrolling because of this trade, and would stop people on the road or shoot from far away. As five of us were returning, some soldiers off to one side of the path saw us and shot. We dropped our goods and ran for our lives. I lost all my valuables and was discouraged from trading any more.

Thus, his search for food was confined to the village and its immediate environs, which added to hunger. Starting from September 1994 his family fled the army frequently and

had to eat rice porridge for two months. After October we reopened the school, but on weekends I found work sawing timber in order to buy rice. I didn’t even want to plant rice anymore at that point. Sometimes all we had to eat were boiled bamboo shoots and roots.

Eventually, Saw Htoo K’baw took up farming again, but his efforts to grow rice were continually frustrated by military action:

It was almost harvest time when we fled to where there was no food. We had not brought much with us, so we ate porridge. For two or three months we hid like that, and my fields were destroyed.

By 1996, conditions had become miserable for the whole village. As an immigrant to the area, Saw Htoo K’baw wasn’t adept at hunting or foraging for wild roots and vegetables, which is how the indigenous people coped with hunger. He turned to his neighbors for charity:

I would forego food so my children could eat. I went around begging for rice. Some people took pity and gave me a cup or two. Most who had migrated to the area like me were suffering considerably.

Picture 14: "In the jungle we had to eat roots and leaves."

His family continued to survive without food security, but conditions were dire. In 1996 they took to the jungle three separate times, during which he saw others suffering an even worse fate:

Each time we had no food. In the forest relationships varied. Some shared food with others then left to look for roots together; others did not. I saw one family close to utter starvation, the two small children crying from hunger. The mother pitifully fed them roots which hadn’t been boiled long enough—she probably didn’t know what else to do. After that they suffered nausea, vomiting and diarrhea.

Eventually they could withstand no more. Losing their home was the last straw:

Around April, it rained very heavily and our house collapsed into the river, totally destroyed. We were left with nothing, no food and no place to stay, so we fled and hid. My children were sick. A KNU official gave me some rice. I thought about the situation and knew we couldn’t stay there anymore, and so we came to this refugee camp.

When we met Saw Htoo K’Baw in April he testified that between 1994 and 1996 up to thirty children, mostly under 5 years old, died from malnutrition. We asked whether he would go back, and he answered:

Picture 15: "We cannot go back, we dare not go back and face the soldiers."

Everyone wants to go back, but is afraid. Even if we went and there were no soldiers, we would still have a food problem in the first year or so. Also there are a lot of landmines, planted by both sides. If there weren’t mines, it would be more feasible.

We have videotaped statements from several people in Papun, all narrating the same story of destruction and flight.

Another informant told a similar tale of military abuse in Myawaddy Township, who reporting that when soldiers came they

Picture 16: "In the forest relationships varied. Some shared their food with others then left to look for roots together

ate our pigs and chickens. Anything that they didn’t eat, they killed, and the rice they couldn’t carry away, they set on fire. Day to day, we could still eat, but over a longer time we would surely have starved. Because we couldn’t travel around, we couldn’t work. We always had to follow their orders. My children suffered from diarrhea and malaria. So before my family reached the point of starvation we fled to this refugee camp. If I had stayed in my village I would surely have died. There were still 20 baskets of threshed rice in my barn. I had to leave all that. 9

 

The above evidence comes from Karen State, but conditions are similar in central and southern Shan State. AHRC’s compilation shows that since March 1996, the Tatmadaw has forcibly relocated over 1400 villages through 7000 square miles. Over 300,000 people have been ordered to move at gunpoint into strategic relocation sites. The relocations intensified in 1997 and 1998, with people in new areas forced move, and existing sites forced to relocate yet again. Vast areas of 11 rural townships have become depopulated "free-fire" zones. One witness described to us relocation in Shan State:

Three to five days after the order, soldiers come back. If villagers haven’t left, either they say ‘go now,’ or burn the village, or shoot—there are many different scenarios. Out of 300,000 people, 100-120,000 have come to Thailand. About 100,000 are in relocation sites, and about 50,000 are on the outskirts of towns where they can find work or have relatives. About 50,000 are hiding. They are trying to survive in the jungles. 10

The Tribunal also heard of a family’s struggle with relocation, hunger and violence in Shan State. Her family

was relocated to Kun Hing in 1996. They went to the relocation site and tried to stay, but couldn’t. They went back into hiding after a year, on a heavily wooded island in the river. Her father would catch fish at night then secretly go to Kun Hing to sell in the market. Just last month he went back to his old village to look for cattle he left there. He was shot and killed. The family lost their breadwinner, so they moved to Kun Hing and the mother sent her to Thailand to earn money.

Picture 17: "People are forced into the jungle, hiding their rice and struggling to survive."

Villagers in the relocation sites work as porters, build roads, dig ditches and erect fences at nearby military camps without food or pay. Most of the relocated people are farmers; so all these changes have seriously affected regional food production.

Similar is the situation in Karenni State. The Tribunal heard that large numbers of Karenni farmers currently live displaced. Some have moved to the relocation camps; the majority remain hidden in the jungle; and some have fled to refugee camps in Thailand. Many see no viable option in Burma and migrate to Thailand to live as refugees or illegal migrant workers.

The relocations about two years ago in Karenni State involved 70-80,000 people, entire regions were moved. People had four choices: 1) go to the relocation site, under Burma army control; 2) stay with relatives in town; 3) hide in the forest; 4) cross the border into Thailand, the last resort. The vast majority of people don't want to come. Many went to the relocation site at Shadaw. Now, two years later, people are arriving in Thailand because they simply could not survive. They tried. There are people who said their father starved to death, people who said, "This does not happen in Burma, people do not starve." They tried to make ends meet, they cannot any longer, and they come to the border. 11

The AHRC has summarized how the civil war creates food scarcity. It identified six factors:

1. Direct attacks on civilians and food
   Military offensives destroy villages, farms, grain and livestock. Food is consistently targeted for destruction. Civilians displaced by combat who return to their fields risk being shot on sight. Some communities are attacked more than once within a year.
2. Looting of food and possessions
   Soldiers take food and livestock without permission and loot other household possessions.
3. Displacing people
   Civilians flee to the jungle, become internally displaced persons (IDPs), and face food shortages. Army columns destroy any hidden food they find. People hide in the jungle as long as they can. When they can no longer survive this way, they try to flee from the area completely.
4. Restrictions on trade and travel
   The army cuts trade and transportation routes to "black" zones, creating shortages of food, medicine and other essentials. Civilians are also denied income through trade.
5. Ecological damage and crop shortfalls
   Frequent military incursions diminish soil fertility by preventing farmers from preparing their fields properly. Military action also interferes with planting, tending and harvesting crops. Therefore, farmers produce a shortfall of paddy and other food.
6. Poor health
   Civilians, particularly children, suffer from malaria, diarrhea, anemia and malnutrition. The evidence links child mortality to food scarcity. Non-government clinics in "black" areas are military targets, and trade in medicines is prohibited, thus denying treatment to the ill.

 

To Live, to Work, to Eat

In areas not entirely controlled by the government, we find systematic population displacement and forced labor, arbitrary taxation, extortion and other infringements on basic economic rights.

The Tribunal heard testimony about the typical problem of two or more armies vying for administrative control. According to a woman from Mon State, military demands piled up with each new regime:

The village was taxed by KNU for a long time, though there were some benefits, such as schools and clinics. When the Burma army came it also made demands, but if fields were not destroyed then we could pay. But with the advent of DKBA in 1996 food problems have grown. 12

Similarly, we read evidence of how civilians are caught between insurgents and the government. In 1996, the Tatmadaw announced the following fines and punishments people in southern Burma’s Thayet Chaung Township:

Any village where insurgents fire a gun must relocate within seven days. If insurgents attack Tatmadaw territory, all villages through which they passed must move. If any Burma army soldiers die in combat, the nearest village must pay compensation of 50,000 kyat for each dead soldier. If insurgents take Tatmadaw equipment or food, the nearest village must pay to replace it. If Tatmadaw loses guns, the nearest village must pay 15,000 kyat for each. Any village where a battle takes place or where insurgent supporters are exposed will be burned to the ground. 13

Map 6: Tenasserim Division (Click to view full image)

Most of Tenasserim Division is a contested area. AHRC has submitted that severe military action since 1997 has displaced much of the rural population. These effects have been documented in various reports such as "Tennasserim Situation Report" (1998) by the KNU Mergui-Tavoy Information Department and "The Situation of the People Living in the Gas Pipeline Project Region" prepared by Mon Information Service (1997). All detail how villagers were conscripted for forced labor on development projects under appalling conditions. Moreover, they had to feed themselves while doing it. Much of this farming population has either been forcibly relocated or if not, subjected to severe restriction of movement. Many are prohibited from staying overnight in their fields, necessary during the labor-intensive planting and harvesting seasons.

We received statements on the fear created by this constant military presence. Naw Ble, a subsistence farmer in Dawei township, reports that she returned home after the army promised not to harm villagers:

We saw all our possessions scattered, and no cock crowed, no dog barked, no cat cried and no cattle wandered about the place. Everything was quiet. The next day, troops started to dig trenches by our houses. They did not harm us, but would climb our trees and take fruit. They ordered us not to leave the village without permission. To go out cost 15 kyat per day, and we had to be back before dark. 14

Picture 18: "It was almost harvest time when we fled to where there was no food.

We found that counter-insurgency measures include the confiscation of food from civilians. The same witness related how her village’s food was taken away:

After wandering in the jungle we felt there were no more places to go. Some people suggested going back would be better than being caught in the jungle. So one day when there were no soldiers in the village, we re-entered… They ordered us to bring our paddy from where we hid it, or they would find and destroy it. Some brought the rice and it was confiscated. The soldiers ate it. At the same time, soldiers went house-to-house selling ration rice for 50 kyat a pyi. We pay to work our own plantations, we serve them without wages, our paddy is looted then we buy back rice to survive. Our fruit and crops are taken, our animals and plants are taken, we are unable to escape. They told us troops in the hills have orders to kill anything they see. We are haunted by this.

"We saw all our possessions scattered, and no cock crowed, no dog barked, no cat cried and no cattle wandered about the place"

This treatment by the military naturally created resentment among the people. Another villager complained:

Picture 19: "They ordered us to bring our paddy from where we hid it, or they would find it and destroy it."

I feel bitter about the troops staying in our village, looting our rice and eating it, then selling us their rations. We have very little money to buy rice. Think about it! How long can you survive without any time to earn money? 15

 

Adjacent to combat zones, "brown" areas are a constant source of conscripted labor. The army forces people to work continually, a practice well documented by international organizations. The International Labour Organization’s exhaustive report commented on the economic ramifications: ¹⁶

Picture 20: "We slept soaked."

Forced labour caused the poorer sections of society who carried out the majority of the labour to become increasingly impoverished. Day labourers needed paid work every day in order to obtain sufficient income and that became impossible when they were forced to provide uncompensated labour. Families who survived on subsistence farming also required every member of the family to contribute to this labour-intensive work, particularly at certain times of the year. Demands for forced labour seriously affected such families. Families who were no longer able to support themselves often moved to an area where they thought the demands for forced labour would be less; if this was not possible, they would often leave Myanmar as refugees. Information provided to the Commission indicated that forced labour was a major reason behind people leaving Myanmar and becoming refugees.

 

Furthermore porters on duty go hungry, as recounted by this 18 year old from Kawthaung Township who was forced to carry loads for an army column in 1997:

All the porters became weak from lack of food. I saw about ten fallen by the way, some were ready to die, rolling around and murmuring. Some had swollen faces and heads. Seeing this I was afraid, since I was weak and could not walk well. I wanted to run but did not know the way, so I carried on even though weak and thin. 17

Another porter serving at the same time echoed this ordeal:

They fed us two cups of rice a day, along with salt and sometimes banana palm shoots. The soldiers had enough rice, curry and canned food. More than 100 porters slept in a shelter we built ourselves. The roof was made from old iron sheets. When it rained the roof did not cover us, so we slept soaked. There were so many sick porters among us. The military didn’t care for the sick. 18

We also saw a report on Palaw Township, where the people are caught between the Burma army and KNU. The Tatmadaw suspects villagers of helping KNU and targets them for all sorts of torture, extortion, and confiscation of food. Thus, many villagers are hiding in "free-fire" zones. These people live in fear that the Burma army will search for them and find them, especially in the dry season. In fact, in the 1998 dry season troops destroyed many jungle plots, and barns, livestock and property were confiscated. The main concern of these internally displaced people is food. The AHRC has also collected several statements from the affected persons. 19

Picture 21: Many villagers are hiding in "free-fire" zones

We read case studies from Bilin Township and Pegu Division. These are areas where people have been forcibly relocated. According to one relocated villager, arbitrary taxation, forced labor and restricted movement result in food scarcity:

Most villagers travel two or three hours to work their farms. Traveling back and forth they can’t really tend their crops, which get damaged by disease, insects and weather. Soldiers moving from one place to the next also trample the fields. Swidden fields must lie fallow before being used again, but because of relocations more people are forced into a small area, so soil quality is deteriorating. Before the harvest is in most people eat rice porridge, perhaps once per day, with a few bamboo shoots, with parents going hungry so children can eat. 20

Picture 22: "They threaten that if anyone shoots at them in the village, then it will become ash."

We also saw evidence of how soldiers ordered farmers throughout eight villages to pay "gardening taxes" on their own trees. The fees were calculated as follows: 18 kyat for each betel palm, 10 for a coconut palm, 15 for cashew, and 5 each for mango, jackfruit, pomelo and lime trees. The army threatened the villagers that failure to pay meant land confiscation.21

AHRC identifies nine conditions which cause food scarcity in such areas:

1. Direct attacks on civilians and food
   The army attacks civilians and food less frequently here than in black zones, but burning of food, houses and fields continues. Populations deemed uncooper-ative experience the worst forms of military excess.
2. Expropriation of food, possessions and land
   The army constantly demands rice and livestock, either without paying or paying little. Soldiers resell military rations while living off food stolen from villagers. Bullock carts are confiscated for work on infrastructure projects. Agricultural land is taken for roads, plantations, barracks or military-run development projects.
3. Relocation
   Forced relocation of villages is common. Movement at relocation camps is tightly restricted, while former village sites are declared "free-fire" zones. Trading may be prohibited. Farmers are denied access to their fields. Those who flee relocation to hide in the jungle expose themselves to free-fire conditions.
4. Forced labor
   The army conscripts unpaid labor on infrastructure development projects. Villagers perform menial duties for the military and portering increases. People have not enough time to work for themselves, and self-sufficiency in the rural economy dissipates.
5. Taxation and fees
   Furthermore, the army levies arbitrary taxes and fees, including fines for defaulting on labor conscription. These payments cover expenses, surcharges and fines imposed by local authorities.
6. Crop procurement
   In some areas, the military enforces a version of the national paddy procurement system (discussed below), straining rice supplies.
7. Rice rationing
   The army confiscates and stockpiles rice, then rations it back to farmers. Restrictions on movement, distance between army camps and relocation centers or villages, and corruption prevent these rations from reaching civilians.
8. Abandoned farmlands
   Economic and military pressures force many farmers to leave their land. The quality of vacated land deteriorates rapidly, so that it may not be successfully replanted immediately.
9. Inadequate health care
   Stringent control on travel, possession of medicine, and a general lack of services means that health care is very poor. Existing clinics may have no trained staff or medical supplies.

No War, No Peace

We also heard evidence from beyond the areas of conflict. In Burma’s non-civil war zones, failed agriculture policies and persistent demands for cash, goods and labor undermine food security. Witnesses testified to rising prices, falling wages, unbearable taxation and the inability to feed one’s family. We divide the evidence into rural and urban areas.

Picture 23: "Most villagers travel two or three hours to work their farms."

Trouble in the Rice Bowl

We heard myriad evidence attesting to hardship in rural Burma created by government agricultural policy, especially regarding production and distribution of lowland paddy. Much of this data comes from lower Burma: Mon State, Pegu Division and Irrawaddy Division.

A 24 year old landless worker from Mon State’s Thaton District described how taxation, government policy and forced labor created hunger in his village

This is a general description of my village since 1988, but things have been worse since 1996 than any time before. The village has only about 18 real landowners, and the rest are hired workers. The biggest farm is 50 acres. I worked on a 13 acre holding, which yielded 60-70 baskets of rice per acre, as long as we used fertilizer.

High taxes and hunger forced some farmers to sell their land. They have to pay the annual quota, which the government buys at 150 kyat per basket. The administration had us build a big dam, and to support this work farm owners paid one more basket per acre annually to the township council. The dam construction began in 1992 and took two years. The water is for the dry season crop. The dam needs maintenance, and if you don’t go you are fined 100 kyat per day.

Government plans to increase rice production included chemical fertilizers and farm machinery as well. Because of corruption, however, farmers did not benefit from these enhancements:

Apart from farming, the people must work on a variety of projects run by the military. Some, such as roads, are public works projects, while others seem to be soldiers’ private concerns.

Villagers build roads without pay. If you don't go, the soldiers make you a porter to the frontline. IB 33 Commander Aung Ye Min established a rubber plantation on 500 acres near the village. The army made people plant trees then fence in the plantation. Cattle used to graze there, and now if they stray back the soldiers shoot and eat them.

Picture 24: "Villagers build roads without pay."

 

So, even without insurgency, rural people face local military rule and hunger. The witness described food scarcity in his village:

Taxes and oppression are starving the village. There’s no time to work, only to pay taxes and do forced labor; many villagers have little food. Some must eat porridge, some only water skimmed off boiled rice, and others only sweet potatoes. To feed the children some adults go without food for one or two days at a time. Even so, children increasingly suffer diarrhea, sore stomachs, and death.

"They said, ‘If you can't stay then get out—we're just following instructions. You farmers are dishonest. When you need something we give it, then you protest. We can't follow your whims any more’."

Picture 25: "Taxes and oppression are starving the village."

Living under these conditions, the informant’s own family did not eat adequately. Food security eluded them, despite their collective efforts. In the end, he left home to find work abroad:

I have 5 children. My oldest daughter, who is eleven, always went to do forced labor while we parents looked for food. You see children 8 or 9 years old working. Sometimes we only had enough rice for porridge. I worked all day, then went home only to hear my children cry from hunger. My tears fell, too. I could not suffer the poverty of my village. I came to Thailand to work and send money home, so that they can eat. 22

We read the statement of a 58 year old widowed farmer from Rangoon Division. This very fertile area had always enjoyed a rice surplus. She related the hardship caused by government policies to increase rice production through irrigation and double cropping. The drive to grow more paddy began with forced labor:

The government made us dam the Ngamoeyeik River then called on us to grow summer paddy. The construction site was 5 miles away, and we walked back and forth every day in the hot season, when it was really stinking hot. Each family in the region had to send people to dig. I heard that one pregnant woman died carrying loads of soil on her head. I had to hoe the ground. The work was enormously tiring. After we went home in the evening, they videotaped the day’s progress. The dam opened in 1995. 23

The dam now complete, farmers had to adapt to the hastily-planned new crop:

Summer paddy started in 1996. They didn't give seeds, we had to buy them. I'll tell you something, they made us buy seeds taken from other farmers. But different strains of rice were all mixed together, one from here, one from there. When we planted we didn't notice the difference, but they grew at different rates. There were three different kinds of rice, so what can you do about that? You can't do anything! You would have to harvest one field three different times, which is too much work. Farmers were furious—some destroyed the whole lot and planted beans or sesame, then bought paddy in the market for their quota.

Despite these initial setbacks, the government enforced the summer crop program. Farmers were forced to comply:

Well, by this time most monsoon paddy had been harvested, and people had planted their beans. But with the dam finished everybody had to grow summer rice. They told us we couldn't grow nuts, we had to grow paddy. Officials from Rangoon, not soldiers, came and ripped up the beans and even unharvested rice. That was just about the last straw. The government said, "We are making you grow summer paddy for you yourselves to eat." They said monsoon paddy is for government and summer paddy would be for farmers.

But flaws in the program continued to frustrate farmers and government alike, particularly irrigation problems:

Picture 26: "The summer crop is a total loss for farmers, but if you don’t do it, the government will take away your land.

When we needed water they didn't open the dam; when we didn’t want water they gave it! At first they didn't release water as some people hadn't finished harvesting all of their crop. Summer paddy needs water, so the government opened the dam and way too much water poured out. People who hadn't finished harvesting their first crop rushed out to gather it all up. In bean fields, water flooded the landscape. Villagers asked, "What are you doing? We can't even live here any more." Then the government answered "If you can't stay then get out—we're just following instructions." Later they cut the water and the summer rice started drying up in the fields. People ended up pumping in water themselves, which was expensive. The administration said, "You farmers are dishonest. When you need something we give it, then you protest. We can't follow your whims any more." The authorities said farmers are inconsistent and don't do things right.

Eventually, farmers confronted the state:

Farmers were now losing their crops. So villagers went to break open the dam themselves. The authorities became angry and said, "You went to break open this dam, so you must relocate!" The village leaders outlined their case step by step, then the authorities understood a little. We didn't have to relocate, but we had to help repair the dam. We nearly died in the stinking hot weather. Anyway, it was all flooded and the paddy was dead, dead, dead. They took video where the crop looked good, where it was green and ripe. They don’t shoot the stuff that didn't grow—you can't say anything about that. The wet paddy smelled foul. The procuring agents refused to take it. Nobody is producing enough grain. No farmer has enough to eat. This is what I know from my own experiences and what I myself have witnessed.

Picture 27: "The government said, ‘We are making you grow summer paddy for yourselves to eat’."

 

Amid this fiasco, farmers still struggled to meet the rice quota. The widow’s family faced insurmountable problems:

My son-in-law and I owed 80 baskets to the government. His 6 acres produce about 200 baskets in a good year. But this year he got less. The government calculates quota by stripping stalks until the grain fills a tin can. Where there's dense growth two or three stalks will fill a can. They said that one acre would produce 80 to 90 baskets. That's what they said... 80 to 90 per acre, compared with 200 for the whole farm in a good year.

Our land was flooded, so we hired a pump. He had only about 60 baskets left, which we took to the administration—the entire lot, and not a single basket was left. But they said, "This grain is no good, we don't want it," and they made him bring it all back.

Picture 28: "No farmer has enough to eat."

Farmers now mix in dirt and other stuff to increase the weight, so even 10 to 20% contain junk. Others bribe—a couple of bottles of alcohol and maybe they get 10 baskets off the quota. Now I've come to Thailand to do some trading, sell medicines and stuff, instead of working there. There's nothing to be gained from it.

While Rangoon Division’s "rice bowl" is under extreme pressure to increase output, farmers everywhere face the quota and forced labor on top of debt and natural disaster. A Dawei Township farmer with four children said:

I have 3 acres. Last year there was a big flood and my entire farm was destroyed. I replanted, but only got 130 baskets, instead of the normal 200 to 250. We have to pay 12 baskets per acre as quota, so that was 36 baskets. Because of the flood I planted twice, so costs doubled. To pay and still meet the quota meant I couldn’t even feed my family. I was conscripted as a front line porter for five months, during which my family had nothing to live on. The only way was to borrow money. That is why we, the people, never get sufficient food, never develop. Several in my village have not been able to repay debts, and have watched the government confiscate their land and transfer it to other farmers. 24

Picture 29: "Now days many people have quit farming because the government forces them to raise cash-crops for export."

"I was conscripted as a front line porter for five months, during which time my family had nothing to live on."

We learned that the government forces people to raise crops for export even when they have nothing to eat. We read about this practice, environmental problems and poverty in the Shan State:

Central Shan State around Hsi Paw and Hsen Wi has big paddy plantations. But now days many people have quit farming because the government forces them to raise cash-crops for export. Paddy also is becoming less beneficial for farmers. Agriculture Department officials push new strains of rice unsuited to the soil and cool weather. They also push soybeans and peanuts as cash crops. But peanuts drain fertility, and the soil must be left to regenerate or it will be useless. The government pays less for produce here than in central Burma. For all of these reasons, people are quitting the land.

It seems that government input to agriculture had always created problems. We read how the BSPP failed to invigorate the land:

During the BSPP period, especially in the early 1980s, farmers traded paddy for chemical fertilizers under the quota system. At first, crops were good, but over time the soil deteriorated and the produce lost its flavor. More fertilizer was required to get the same yield. Now much of this land no longer produces; the chemicals caused permanent damage. Nowadays, the only chemical fertilizer comes from China, and only big landowners can afford it. Large areas once cultivated in Hsen Wi are now barren, commodity prices are rising and people are hungry. Disused land is taken by the army.

We also have a report about hunger in Arakan State, where the Muslim minority, known as Rohingyas, are generally denied Burmese citizenship and have been repeatedly swept into refugee camps in Bangladesh. International human rights organizations noted:

Since most of the Rohingyas are unskilled day laborers, one day of work without pay can mean one day without food for the whole family. The availability of work depends very much on the agricultural cycle, and during summer there tends to be very little work. In the past, Rohingyas traveled to find work in towns, but since 1991 their freedom of movement has been severely restricted… They thus have very few sources of income to begin with, and since the dry season also happens to be the best time for construction work, when forced labor demands are most intense, the burden on the Rohingyas is particularly acute. ²⁵

All the above evidence demonstrates food scarcity’s prevalence. However, we saw that hunger is not only widespread, but also serious. It has caused malnutrition and death in children, and increased poverty for the whole family. An informant from a fertile region of the Irrawaddy Division, recorded hunger’s impact in his neighborhood.

In 1993 three children died a couple of doors down from my house. All boys, they were around 10, 8 and 6. The children had always been weak and malnourished, especially in the last couple of years. Their bellies were distended and their ribs stuck out—like starving African children we saw in magazines. Their knees were swollen and their calves were sticks. Their skin was white, their lips pale. They often had diarrhea. Their father worked cutting grass and bamboo to build houses. They all died about a week apart—I remember because I went to cut timber for a week, came back and heard one had died. I went back to the forest, came home the next week and another was gone. Just one week later the third child died. We knew the family well. I remember the family’s condition and how this all came to pass.

Picture 30: "The soil must be left to regenerate or it will be useless."

Map 2: Irrawaddy Division (Click to view full image)

Before they died, the children were hungry for many years. Their family was caught up in a political and economic crisis going on far outside their village.

"The children had always been weak and malnourished, especially in the last couple of years. Their bellies were distended and their ribs stuck out—like starving African children we saw in magazines."

Their father used to grow bananas, cucumbers, and watermelons on a small plot about two miles outside the village. After the 1988 uprising, the government consolidated the village, so the family had to move. Wild elephants ate all their plants, and so he turned to cutting bamboo. He earned about eighty kyat per day, which might have been enough, but he only got cash when bamboo traders came, so the family sometimes went hungry. Also, at 45 he was getting arthritis and couldn’t work every day. His family of seven ate no more than mine of five, and my children were younger. They begged for help frequently. Of course, we pitied them and helped as we could. Apart from rice, my wife gave them salt and fish paste. When the children got diarrhea nobody suspected anything serious. They took some Burmese medicine, but that didn’t stop it. Intravenous drips might have helped, but those cost 150 kyat or so, and nobody could afford them. So they passed away. The parents knew their children were dying, but there was no health care or medicine. Their father could only weep, heartbroken.

Reflecting on these tragic deaths, the informant commented on the government’s role in food scarcity:

I knew this was a wrong and terrible thing. In my opinion, these children died from starvation. If they had adequate food they wouldn’t have died. And they weren’t the only ones, but I don’t know the others’ details. In nearby villages there was a minor epidemic. No matter how deep in poverty, people are never excused from demands for labor and money. This family had no alternative but to struggle for survival every day, and so the children died. 26

These narratives represent the evidence presented to us. They are but a sampling of the voluminous documentation we received. The next section presents the last source of evidence we considered, Burma’s cities and towns.

 

Hunger in the City

Food scarcity also affects Burma’s cities. The Tribunal heard of high food costs, endemic corruption, forced labor, and dislocated rural villagers drifting into cities in search of work or simply to beg for food.

The cost of food rose steadily through the 1990s. By 1998, most poor families in the capital city could manage only one meal per day 27, though food security was by no means elusive only to the urban poor. In January 1997 a former office worker from Rangoon reported,

Picture 31: "We have to tell lies in order to use our own property."

The biggest problem is feeding our families. Nearly everyone in Rangoon is struggling just to eat. Since we need money for other things as well, usually we eat less or eat very simply. This is a general economic condition, not the problem of only poor people. My house, for example, could be called middle-class, but we face the same problems with food as everyone else. 28

Poor urbanites earn their food one day at a time:

Sundry workers include petty vendors, tri-shaw drivers, hired laborers, and the like. They earn between 50 to 180 kyat per day, barely sufficient to cover the cost of rice. They purchase only 2-3 pyi at a time. Agricultural laborers working for the government get only 20 kyat per day, but have the privilege of purchasing 12 pyi of polished rice for only 20 kyat. Sometimes they get afternoon meals free. Most are women and teenage children. Only the combined income of all members in a household enables people to survive. 29

Civil servants fare no better. While they may receive some benefits, their income is sapped by a range of petty fees: thirty kyat for monthly charge for volunteer fire watch, fifteen for porter fees, two hundred for rice, twenty for assorted benefits, ten for special consumer discount rights, fifty to support festivals, and two hundred for electricity. Half of one’s salary may be lost to such fees.30 Compounding this loss are stagnant wages from the government. Even a substantial pay raise in the early 1990s was lost to inflation: That the government has basically kept wages fixed only exacerbates these conditions. A 1993 wage-hike averaging around 30% for all civil servants has not helped to prevent the slide in real wages. The official CPI was running at 30% annually between 1989 and 1993, and has risen since then. On the basis of private estimates, prices of basic necessities in the unofficial/black markets in Rangoon and other major cities across Burma have been rising at an average annual rate of over 100% since 1989. 31

Picture 32: More visible are the social symptoms of food scarcity: poverty and children dropping out of school to work.

Government workers struggle to eat in ways which affect everyone else. The Tribunal heard that, perhaps inevitably,

A witness from Shan state told us personally how poverty and corruption among government teachers affects the nation’s education system:

In 1988 we moved to Taunggyi, but the education system wasn’t good there, the teachers weren’t very enthusiastic. Because they needed extra income, in the classroom they didn’t teach the full curriculum. To pass the exams, students had to pay the teachers for extra tutoring.

As in rural areas, these various expenses and fees compound the authoritarian demands by the government. Though the cities may at first glance appear free from military pressure, security is not guaranteed. The witness continued:

Picture 34: "When I was young I didn’t know why they all came, but later I learned that no villages were left in the surrounding countryside; they had all been relocated."

In Taunggyi the government widened the roads. People had their land confiscated and their houses demolished. My family lived in a small town and was never forced to relocate this way, but every day I saw people fleeing or being relocated to the outskirts of town. Nearby villages had to relocate to suburbs, one or two miles out. When I was young I didn’t know why they all came, but later I learned that no villages were left in the surrounding countryside; all had been relocated. When I left, there was only one army camp, on a hilltop. I went back to visit in 1994 and saw that outside the two were many new military camps, set up on land that used to belong to the people.

AHRC has listed seven factors causing hunger outside the war zones:

1. Paddy quota
   The government taxes farmers through a compulsory rice purchase system based on unrealistic crop yields. The quota is calculated according to acreage, not production, and prescribes unrealistically high contributions. Bad weather, flooding or crop failures due to flawed government projects do not exempt farmers. Many must buy rice then resell it for quota, at considerable loss. Reform has failed.
2. Agricultural development
   Programs to increase yield have failed to realize food security. Not only do farmers lose money, but they must borrow money for fertilizers and farm equipment. If they do not to comply with government regulations, they risk land confiscation. Summer rice programs in Irrawaddy Division and Mon State illustrate the effects of these policies. Where crop yields do increase, the government reaps the benefit: surplus paddy is sold for export, rather than distributed to hungry farmers.
3. Land confiscation
   The law empowers the government to take away people’s land swiftly and efficiently 33. Apart from land confiscation, small farmers abandon their land when rice farming is no longer economically viable. They become hired laborers whose daily wage can not guarantee food security.
4. Forced labor
   As in civil war zones, the government conscripts uncompensated labor on public works. Such work includes servicing irrigation projects related to the summer paddy program. This labor impedes food security by reducing farmers’ time and capital for agriculture.
5. Economic policy
   The government has created rice shortages by removing paddy from the domestic market and selling it overseas. Furthermore, this rice has been purchased substantially below market rates. Rice prices have inflated and the kyat has fallen, which affects all food prices. The government has reduced wages and benefits to the army and civil service, contributing to endemic corruption by state officials.
6. Arbitrary fees
   Quite apart from the rice quota system, administrative and military officials levy a range of fees, fines and arbitrary taxes. These payments are not part of an official national tax structure, but are instead an institutionalized form of corruption which uses the formal structure of the state to support a shadow economy.
7. Inadequate community health service
   Malnutrition and illness are compounded by a general lack of health services and high costs for medicine and health care. Children have suffered hunger, disease and death.

To recap: AHRC has presented a large amount of evidence attesting to food scarcity across a range of economic and political circumstances. This evidence comes from firsthand sources such as depositions and statements, as well as secondary sources analyzing politics and economy. Many, though not all, witnesses appeared before us and answered our questions. Overall, we find this evidence to be informative, consistent, and credible, and therefore will draw from it our findings and conclusions.

Government Response

1		A catalogue of material submitted to the Tribunal, witness deposition, testimonies, and a bibliography are attached as Appendices 2,3, 4 and 7 respectively.
2		Saw Kwe Say, Report on the Conditions in Free Fire Zones of Mudraw and Mone Townships, 1996.
3		AHRC, First Submission to the People’s Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarization in Burma, 1 February 1999, p. 73.
4		"Confidential Report to Burma Issues on taxation and extortion of villages in Kyauk Kyi Township, Pegu Division," 17 October 1998.
5		Karen Human Rights Group, Wholesale Destruction: The SLORC/SPDC Campaign to Obliterate All Hill Villages in Papun and Eastern Nyaunglebin Districts, Chiang Mai: Nopburee Press, April 1998.
6		AHRC, p. 73.
7		See "The mountains of war," Testimony 1, Appendix 4.
8		See "War and hunger in the 1990s," Testimony 2, Appendix 4.
9		See "A village teacher," Testimony 4, Appendix 4.
10		See the First Witness’ deposition, Appendix 3.
11		See the First Witness’ deposition,Appendix 3.
12		See "Forced Relocation," Testimony 23, Appendix 4.
13		Adapted from Terror in the South: Militarisation, Economics and Human Rights in Southern Burma, All Burma Students Democratic Front, November 1997
14		See "Wandering in the jungle," Testimony 13, Appendix 4.
15		See "No living things," Testimony 14, Appendix 4.
16		International Labour Organisation, "Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma). Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). Geneva, 1998."
17		AHRC, p. 132.
18		See "Shouldering the burden," Testimony 15, Appendix 4.
19		AHRC, p. 139
20		See "Forced relocation," Testimony 23, Appendix 4.
21		Win Hlaing, "Tenasserim Division: Thayet Chaung /Ye Pyu Townships Rural Conditions," 25 October 1998

22		See "The reality of agricultural development," Testimony 24, Appendix 4.
23		The New Light of Myanmar, 27 March 1995, reported on the dam's inauguration. It was later covered in "Minister for A&I inspects Ngamoeyeik Dam, paddy fields in Bago Division," New Light of Myanmar, 6 September 1998.
24		AHRC, p.181.
25		Human Rights Watch/Asia; Refugees International, Bangladesh/Burma – Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: The Search for a Lasting Solution, August 1997, pp. 11-12. Further information on food scarcity can be found in "Rohingya said to be fleeing famine," The Nation, 11 May 1997 and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, "Starvation Looms in Arakan," Newsletter, April 1997.
26		See "Food scarcity in the delta," Testimony 26, Appendix 4.
27		American Embassy Rangoon, p. 33.
28		"The Inside Perspective," Burma Issues, January 1997.
29		AHRC, p. 186.
30		National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, Human Rights Yearbook 1996, July 1997, p. 221.
31		Mya Maung, "The State of the Burmese Economy under Military Management," in Human Rights Yearbook 1995, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, May 1996, p. 33.
32		Confidential Report to Burma Issues, July 1997.
33		Mon Information Service (Bangkok), Abuses Against Peasant Farmers in Burma, July 1998.
34		The letter is attached here as Appendix 1.

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PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL ON FOOD SCARCITY AND MILITARIZATION IN BURMA
Email: tribunal@ahrchk.org