FINDINGS

In light of the evidence before us, as summarized in the previous section, we may render our findings. The People's Tribunal finds that indeed food scarcity is widespread and serious in Burma today. Provisionally, we find Burma to be militarized, and that a causal nexus links militarization to food scarcity. This section of the report details why we arrive at these conclusions.

On the Right to Food

The right to food, as defined by the International Bill of Rights, has been denied to a large but unknown number of people. As explained in the scope of the Tribunal, the right to food invests certain positive obligations in all sovereign states. Burma has never ratified the relevant international legal instruments, but this failure to publicly accede diminishes neither the validity nor the universality of the concepts they represent. In fact, the Government has committed itself to them in its own public statements.

Picture 36: "They fed what they had to the children, and the adults fasted."

 

The Right to Work

The evidence consistently and convincingly illustrated that the state prevents people from working to achieve food security. Farmers are prevented from using their land, water and other natural resources to provide sufficient food. They are not free to choose when, how and what to cultivate. They are not free to devote their own labor to food security. Communities in armed conflict zones are prevented from using their labor, land and natural resources to achieve food security. Farmers in non-conflict zones are compelled to appease the state first, and feed themselves second. Regardless of their own economic well-being, farmers and others are required to provide goods and services to state institutions, especially the army.

State rhetoric conflicts diametrically with reality, but what Burma’s government says about food security demonstrates an awareness of its obligations. For example, in March 1998 the government reported to the World Food Summit, an intergovernmental conference, that "The Government of Myanmar remains totally pledged to the achievement of food security for all. 1" The report outlines a series of commitments conforming to the Summit’s Plan of Action:

"The Government of Myanmar remains totally pledged to the achievement of food security for all."

Commitment One: We will ensure an enabling political, social, and economic environment designed to create the best conditions for the eradication of poverty and for durable peace... which is most conducive to achieving sustainable food security for all... Commitment Two: We will implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and inequality and improving physical and economic access by all, at all times, to sufficient, nutritionally adequate and safe food and its effective utilization...

To pursue poverty eradication, among both urban and rural poor and sustainable food security... the Government have laid down agriculture sector policies as follows:

• Free choice of crop production
• Provision of right to cultivate to those who develop new agriculture land or who are cultivating the land
• Provision of land ownership to the perennial crops growers, as long as they are producing commercially...

The Tribunal finds that despite these commitments to ensuring farmers’ rights and food security, the government consistently undermines its own stated goals and obligations. The evidence shows that in civil war zones farmers are simply denied the right to cultivate. Farmers in eastern, central and lower Burma who would prefer to plant beans and pulses, relatively quota-free crops, are nevertheless compelled to grow paddy. The government prescribes land for rice production and confiscates land from farmers who do not grow paddy. We find that these policies negate farmers’ self sufficiency, deny their right to work and deprive them of food.

 

Paddy Procurement

The law empowers Burma’s government to purchase for redistribution or resale a percentage of all paddy. A compulsory nationwide program conducted by a government agency, buying substantially below market price, it is effectively a crop tax. The rationale for the low price paid, about half of market value, is to feed the armed forces and provide discounted rice to civil servants. Furthermore, MAPT exports paddy earning foreign currency.

Picture 37: In practice, the government denies rice to the very people who grow it

Despite its theoretical merits, the paddy quota fails to promote food security. In practice, the government denies rice to the very people who grow it, people who don’t have enough to eat. Hungry farmers grow rice, but the State takes it away without otherwise providing for their food security. This is severe injustice.

The paddy quota is inherently unfair, unrealistically and inflexibly assessing how much rice farmers can spare. Furthermore, through this coercive system the government pays little for rice destined to bring high profits in overseas markets, with no commensurate payment to farmers whatsoever. Corruption and quota pressures mean sometimes farmers must sell even more paddy than calculated. Agents subtract moisture content, and thus demand greater volume. Farmers have little choice but to accept these adjustments. In addition to the MAPT quota, local authorities compel farmers to sell more rice at MAPT prices. This black-market quota may amount to several percent of paddy production. In remote areas, the army conducts virtually all paddy procurement, arbitrarily and with force.

It appears that this system is a major cause of inflation in Burma’s economy. Expensive rice means higher costs for all food, and rural and urban people alike can not feed themselves adequately. Given the uniform evidence detailing how paddy procurement siphons rice from rural households, and the economic hardship this system creates for farmers, the Tribunal judges it a significant factor in food scarcity

 

Forced Labor

Forced labor has been Burma’s most widely documented and roundly condemned human rights violation.2 To maintain our scope of inquiry, we will confine this discussion to forced labor’s relationship with food scarcity. In a word, the State’s demand for compulsory, uncompensated labor denies the right to food.

Witnesses testified to the economic hardship incurred by this inflexible, time-consuming and sometimes dangerous work. Conditions of forced labor vary throughout the country. Once again, the difference depends on war zones. Portering for the army, minesweeping and serving military installations increase worker risks. Several porters attested to being underfed, neglected and abused. Wherever forced labor takes place, it affects agriculture, household income and food in three ways. First, it reduces the amount of time and energy people spend in productive work to feed themselves. Second, it extracts cash from households. Last, the actual work forces people to face hunger.

Forced labor is a common practice with severe repercussions on household economy and food scarcity. The evidence before the Tribunal from a variety of sources indicates that it is a major drain on Burma’s rural economy and a significant cause of food scarcity.

 

Counter-insurgency

Nowhere does the state deny food more blatantly than in combat zones. The Tribunal finds the counter-insurgency program to have absolutely decimated food security in and around combat zones. The strategy is simple but effective: stop food, funds, recruits and intelligence from reaching insurgents by severing ties between guerrillas and civilians. Since the guerrillas generally operate in small mobile units, the Four Cuts fall on rural villages in six ways.

Arbitrary and severe violence has destroyed countless rural villages, scattering people throughout the jungles.

 

The Army Destroys Food and Crops

Military operations in the civil war zones target the rural food supply. Apparently, the army’s justification is that this food, or some portion of it, is in fact being supplied to insurgent forces, and therefore must be withheld. The army does attempt to distinguish between food intended for civilian consumption and food allegedly destined for the rebels. Instead, the army targets crops which provide the local food supply, in fear that if harvested, this rice would feed guerrillas. Tilling the soil, planting, tending fields, harvesting—all phases of agriculture are subject to attack.

The Army Displaces Civilians

Arbitrary and severe violence has destroyed countless rural villages, scattering people throughout the jungles. Where the army conducts intermittent raids but has no permanent bases, civilians may choose to remain in or near their villages, hiding when soldiers approach. Familiar with the local terrain, hunting conditions and edible plants, native inhabitants attempt to survive despite the loss of their homes and farms. The Four Cuts have thus created a phenomenon of internally displaced people (IDPs), living with perpetual food scarcity.

The Tribunal finds that the severest cases of food scarcity, including reports of starvation, occur among IDPs made homeless by the military strategy. Furthermore, this sector of Burmese society has the fewest alternatives when facing a food crisis. The army’s presence makes travel hazardous, even when people cross the border into Thailand as refugees.

The Army Relocates Villages

Relocating human settlements is a major element of the strategy, uprooting hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions—of people over the years and in many cases devastating the rural economy. This is coerced, involuntary relocation, enforced by the army. Typically, a village either receives written order or a visit by military officers, who command it to move.

Picture 39: "They told us troops in the hills have orders to kill anything they see. We are haunted by this."

The Tribunal found that some areas, such as the eastern Pegu Yoma mountains, have known strategic relocation for nearly three decades. Major forced relocation in Pegu Division began in the 1970s, when hill villages were moved close to army posts, and numerous restrictions were placed on travel out of the relocation sites. In 1979, one hundred refugees from Thaton district crossed over the Thai/Burmese border and became the first group of Burmese refugees to enter Thailand. 3

Picture 40: "This year we ran from the army four times."

But forced relocation is not confined to any one region; it happens wherever the army faces the threat of insurgency. One of the most comprehensive and damaging forced relocations ever is currently underway in the Shan State, where over 300,000 people have been moved for strategic purposes.4 At the relocation sites villagers are called on to work for the Burma army, such as building stockades, doing chores at army posts, guarding roads, building railroads serving as porters, and a variety of other tasks the local military designates. However, many people ordered to relocate do not move to the new sites. They may migrate to cities and become hired workers.

 

We find that relocation has profound effects on food security. Moving people cuts them off from their land and natural resource base, subsistence farmers’ lifeline. The military neither compensates people for these losses nor designates new land. In the words of a Tatmadaw officer explaining relocation to villagers, "This is military rule… you stay where we tell you to stay." 5

Furthermore, food is tightly restricted in relocation centers, depending on the army’s perception of insurgent threat and whether rations actually exist. Relocation creates serious long-term food scarcity, rather than seasonal hunger arising from military incursions or heavy taxes at harvest time. A relocated family has lost its land, and with it the children’s future security in the rural economy. Economically, they must begin again, often starting from zero.

The Army Expropriates Cash and Materials

Relocated or not, people must provide cash, goods and services to local military authorities. Refugees sometimes cite these unrelenting and excessive demands as reasons why they left. Although witnesses call it taxation, there is no connection to any national revenue or excise department. Quite to the contrary, it is an ad hoc practice serving military needs, and individual soldiers’ arbitrary and sometimes capricious demands. Construction materials, food, livestock, liquor and virtually any other items are expropriated or taxed in this way. The army has also made civilians responsible for security by threatening heavy fines for any local rebel activity. The military promises economic ruin for any village tolerating guerrilla action.

Picture 41: "This is military rule… you stay where we tell you to stay."

On Militarization

The Tribunal recognized prima facie that Burma has a military government and that the army is prominent in national affairs. These facts of militarism were never in doubt, but nonetheless have been amply demonstrated in our foregoing discussions on the right to food. Our inquiry does, however, assess militarization as defined in the scope: military ideology, values and social structures pervading and dominating the economic, social and political life of the country. Militarism describes an army pursuing its conventional role with much vigor; militarization describes the pursuit and capture of all society.

We can not study this problem’s complexity solely by surveying food scarcity. One would have to define Burma’s military institutions, their history, activities, structure and philosophy, then examine in detail their social, cultural and psychological effects. One would need to examine how military ideology is propagated through folklore, education and mass media. Ideally, one would interview military officers, rank-and-file soldiers within the Tatmadaw and its opposition.

Do the Tribunal’s findings on denial of food indicate militarization of Burma? We find that they do.

Such a definitive inquiry exceeds our scope; it is complex and important enough to warrant a Tribunal of its own. Here, we will confine our assessment to the inquiry at hand: denial of food. We therefore pose and answer the following question: Do the Tribunal’s findings on denial of food indicate militarization of Burma? We find that they do.

Routine State Functions

We found two major causes of food scarcity to be paddy procurement and public works projects. Although military involvement should not be necessary for these routine functions of government, both fall under explicit and implicit military control.

In theory, paddy procurement is a contract between farmers and the state. Tax collection is a normal and reasonable state duty. To this end, MAPT and associated agencies have staff and offices throughout the country, performing their duty in cooperation with town and village authorities. Furthermore, the national police force, to the extent that it is separate from the army, deals with violations of tax law. Therefore, there is no apparent institutional need for the army.

Nevertheless, the paddy quota has been militarized through coercive military force. Evidence showed that soldiers took rice from farmers late for the quota, and that military officials physically and verbally assaulted farmers for not producing enough paddy for quota. For example, in 1997 the Mudon Township Council set a January quota deadline. When farmers were late, soldiers "simply went to houses and barns and took the grain by force." 6 In areas without MAPT officers or where the army must provide for itself, the quota is replaced by arbitrary taxation, levied with impunity and military violence. Unlike rice collected by the government then redistributed to the army, this tax is consumed locally by the "tax man" himself. Clearly, the military usurps taxation as a routine and legitimate function of government.

Militarization of Agriculture

Burma is an agrarian society. Farming is not just an occupation, but a way of life. Conceivably, high taxes and unpaid labor might constrict agrarian living without threatening the foundation of subsistence agriculture: fertile land and productive work. Yet there has been a militarization of agricul-ture through continuous preference for military priorities over farmers’ needs.

The Tribunal finds that buying paddy, building dams, increasing production and selling rice on the world market all put military interests above food security. On one hand, these imply development and open-market reform. On the other hand, the hand of reality, they have been a human rights disaster. These policies would not be so uniformly terrible if planned and carried out democratically. The essential problem is that militarization simultaneously depends on farmers and negates their way of life.

Picture 43: "People are only thinking of how to get a little food to fill their stomachs."

The government correctly identifies agriculture as Burma’s economic foundation, and formally specifies development as a national objective.7 Officially, the government’s Four Economic Objectives are

• Development of agriculture as the base and all-round development of other sectors of the economy as well
• Proper evolution of the market-oriented economy
• Development of the economy inviting participation in terms of technical know-how and investments from sources inside the country and abroad
• The initiative to shape the national economy must be kept in the hands of the State and the national peoples

Furthermore, promoting rice cultivation makes sense as economic policy, ensuring a homegrown staple diet. The problem is that various development schemes and policies never challenge the assumption that Burma needs to recruit, feed and equip a huge army. This army’s simple existence strains the rural economy: recruiting farmers to be soldiers; feeding them with other farmers’ rice; and buying materiel with rice export. Agriculture has become the basis for military buildup. Controlling and exploiting agricultural production have therefore become military goals. The military pursues these goals in a spirit of conquest and militarism.

Picture 44: Promoting rice cultivation makes sense as economic policy, ensuring a homegrown staple diet

This is militarization, not mere militarism, for two reasons. First, it is a thorough, systematic and nationwide orientation towards military control of agriculture, replete with violence, intimidation and military fanfare. Second, and perhaps more telling, is that military structure and ideology take over government, abrogating farmers’ self-sufficient way of life. This was clear with the Ngamoeyeik dam, where the government’s hierarchy meddled with farmers’ expert knowledge of land and water, resulting in flood, drought and farmers simply giving up. When the people complained, "What are you doing? We can’t even live here anymore!" officials replied that they didn’t know, they were just following orders. It was nearly impossible for farmers to participate in decisions about agriculture. Militarization’s values—buildup of the armed forces, hierarchy, and blind obedience—seem incompatible with agrarian living.

 

Military in the Media

Food scarcity also suggests militarization through government’s control of state media. Again, it is necessary to distinguish simple militarism, which might use mass communication to honor or celebrate the armed forces, from militarization, in which propaganda goes a step further, promoting military attitudes and priorities. Militarism depicts the army’s forceful presence; militarization prepares the whole society to think and feel like soldiers going into battle. Mainstream opinion is made to reflect goals normally confined to the army.

Every day the state reiterates these goals, which are printed in newspapers, announced on television and repeated at public events. Apart from the Four Political, Four Economic and Four Social Objectives of the State is the People’s Desire, a propaganda campaign begun in 1996. The sum of these slogans is supposed to represent the common will. The People’s Desire comprises four commitments to safeguarding the nation: 8

Picture 45: Militarization prepares the whole society to think and feel like soldiers going into battle.

• Oppose those relying on external elements, acting as stooges, holding negative views.
• Oppose those trying to jeopardize stability of the State and progress of the nation.
• Oppose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the State.
• Crush all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy.

The government claimed these statements to be the product of mass meetings featuring speeches, patriotic oaths and unanimous ratification of the People’s Desire. As army propaganda, there is nothing remarkable here. All militaries are assigned to protect the State. The People’s Desire is remarkable because it is not supposed to be military propaganda, but a summary of civilian wishes. It embodies several ideas: that civilians and the Tatmadaw are indivisible, that what’s good for the army is good for the people, and that true victory will come when the populace truly adopts militant nationalism. Conspicuously absent from these aims are political negotiation, poverty eradication and similar "hearts and minds" tactics. Food security, land rights, health care and education, desires that some of Burma’s people expressed to the Tribunal, apparently have no place.

Picture 46: "We are the lucky ones, to be able to leave."

State media further confuses the roles of soldier and farmer by continuously reporting on military officials’ input to agriculture. Inspecting fields, checking irrigation ditches, making speeches to farmers, reviewing machinery and "leaving necessary instructions" wherever officials go—all are public acts which reinforce the message of army leadership in rural life.

If standard propaganda featuring military speeches and parades reveal militarism, then formulations like the People’s Desire, which superimpose military thinking on the whole population, reveal militarization.

Popular Opinion

We found the last indicator of militarization to be witness statements. Witnesses repeatedly expressed that Burma is dominated by military, and that rights and freedoms they wish for are therefore impossible. People believe Burma is hopelessly militarized, and that military influence forces them into misery. This viewpoint was especially convincing in testimony from refugees, who weren’t merely opining on politics, but explaining why they left their homes, gave up their land and now live in extreme poverty. The military’s predominance is real and pervasive enough to affect people’s most important economic and social decisions.

Such statements make three points. First is the perception that military rule is a nationwide reality with serious implications for everybody. The second is that military rule is absolute, leaving no viable alternative other than flight. Not a single witness expressed faith in the justice system or even mentioned Burma’s courts. Lastly, traditional values of rural society have collapsed: the state has turned people against each other. It has replaced trust and cooperation with desperate competition for survival. All of these elements can be seen in Saw Roman’s direct testimony to the Tribunal:

Many people have experienced far greater suffering than us. We are the lucky ones, to be able to leave. I consider Burma my home and my land, but because of gross injustice and abuse, we are forced to run away. We grew rice until this year. I even planted a new crop, but we had to leave it all. If we harvested early to pay for the journey people would have suspected. So we lost everything. 9

Picture 47: "Crush all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy."

Saw Roman’s family might have survived another season; perhaps next year’s quota will decrease; the neighbors may not be informers after all. Speculation is immaterial, because Saw Roman’s view of life in Burma has been militarized. He is resigned to the supremacy of the armed forces. Justified or not this resignation is shared by many, and demonstrates militarization’s advances on national psyche.

1		Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, The National Report to CFS on the Implementation of the World Food Summit Plan of Action Until End 1997 (Union of Myanmar), The Government of the Union of Myanmar, March 1998, p. 9.
2		The most comprehesive treatment of forced labor in Burma is found in the International Labour Organisation’s "Forced Labour in Myanmar (Burma)."
3		Saw Nyi Nyi, "Burma Issues internal report," 1997, p. 5.
4		See Shan Human Rights Foundation, Dispossessed: Forced Relocation and Extrajudicial Killings in Shan State, April 1998.
5		Second Strategic Command officer, Colonel Aung Naing Tun, to a meeting of headmen at Thandaung, Papun Township, Karen State, in 1995. "Confidential Report to Burma Issues: Summary of 1995 offensive in Papun Township," 1997.

6		Mon Information Service, "Human Rights Report 1/97: The Forced Purchasing of Paddy in Mon State," May 1997, Report 1.
7		The Four Political Objectives are 1) Stability of the State, community peace and tranquillity, prevalence of law and order; 2) National reconsolidation; 3) Emergence of a new and enduring State Constitution; 4) Building of a new modern developed nation in accord with the new State Constitution. The Four Social Objectives are 1) Uplift of the morale and morality of the entire nation; 2) Uplift of national prestige and integrity and preservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage and national character; 3) Uplift of dynamism of patriotic spirit; 4) Uplift of health, fitness and education standards of the entire nation.
8		As broadcast daily on TV Myanmar.
9		See Saw Roman’s deposition in Appendix 3.

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PEOPLE'S TRIBUNAL ON FOOD SCARCITY AND MILITARIZATION IN BURMA
Email: tribunal@ahrchk.org